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PREFACE 
This paper is part of a series of political economy Working Papers prepared for the Inter-
Governmental Authority on Development’s Livestock Policy Initiative (IGAD LPI) and the 
Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Initiative (PPLPI) of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
of the United Nations. The purpose of these papers is to explore strategic political 
economy issues that would facilitate or inhibit livestock policy reforms in the IGAD region 
that would benefit poor producers.  
Specifically, this paper seeks to understand how the Inter-Governmental Authority on 
Development’s Livestock Policy Initiative (IGAD LPI), a project jointly managed by IGAD 
and the Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Initiative of FAO (PPLPI), can assist the poor livestock 
producers in the greater Horn of Africa to improve their livelihoods through strategic 
policy or institutional interventions. Unlike many policy papers, however, this report 
specifically and explicitly examines the political context in which livestock are produced, 
and aims to identify entry points that are truly feasible given these political realities. The 
report identifies key national and international actors, institutions and processes that 
surround formal and informal policy-making relevant to livestock production, the 
institutional bases of existing policies, and finally, strategies and resources required to 
make the politically feasible changes and creations possible. The recommendations made 
in this paper are therefore based on strategic choices, and not the technical or economic 
merits of various policy options. 
Livestock is vital to the economies of many developing countries, and especially those of 
the Horn of Africa. Animals are a source of protein for human diets and can serve to 
provide income, employment and foreign exchange within a country. For many low 
income producers, livestock also serves as a store of wealth, provides draught power and 
organic fertilizer for crop production, acts as a means of transport, and serves as a vital 
component of social functions and exchange. Consumption of livestock and livestock 
products in developing countries, though starting from a low base, is growing rapidly. This 
sector growth could provide opportunities for the livestock-dependent poor to improve 
their livelihood, and this report aims to recommend politically feasible policy and 
institutional changes that can allow this to happen. 
To arrive at its recommendations, this report uses the analytic tools of political science to 
determine policies that will be truly feasible in a particular real-world political context.  
The author is neither an economist nor a specialist in livestock production and is not using 
the criteria of those disciplines in its suggestions.  The report instead seeks to select on 
the grounds of political feasibility from among the recommendations that local and 
international experts have made on technical or economic grounds. Thus, the report 
identifies key national and international actors, institutions and processes and their role 
in policy-making relevant to livestock, the institutional bases of existing policies, and 
finally strategies and resources required to make selected changes and creations possible. 
Methodologically, the paper is based on several weeks of field work in the area, 
supplemented with a thorough review of government documents, newspapers and 
recently published research. The author relied foremost upon the informed observer 
method of research, conducting interviews with individuals and groups of people in a 
position to understand the political economy of the livestock sector, including the 
processes that shape its policies and their reform. Thus interviews were held with those in 
the government, the donor community, non-governmental organizations, academia, and 
the leadership of relevant livestock and other civil society organizations. These interviews 
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were not a ‘random sample’ nor even necessarily ‘representative’; the author sought 
those who had knowledge drawn from their own work and experience.  
Due to the sensitive political nature of this research, interviewees were offered 
anonymity and confidentiality for their statements, and very few people chose to waive 
this right. Even though this report cannot cite their names, the author subjected 
informants’ statements to high standards of rigor. The author sought to be conscious of 
any partisan bias or rumor that informants might have had in their report and whether 
they were actually in a position to know on personal or very strong secondary authority 
what they reported. In most cases corroboration for key analytic points was sought as 
well, either from other informants or through quotable statements from academic 
literature. Where corroboration was impossible and the point was important the author 
generally has indicated the number of people who supported the point, so the reader can 
judge for him/herself the strength of the evidence. On occasion, the use of corroboration 
via academic literature may give the paper a ‘desk study’ veneer, but it is the 
understandings of the informants – analyzed with the theoretical tools of political science 
– that drive the conclusions.  
We hope this paper will provide useful information to its readers and any feedback is 
welcome by the authors, IGAD LPI, FAO PPLPI and the Livestock Information, Sector 
Analysis and Policy Branch (AGAL) of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). 
Disclaimer 
The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not 
imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of either the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations or the Inter-Governmental Authority on 
Development concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or its 
authorities concerning the delimitations of its frontiers or boundaries.  
The opinions expressed in this paper are solely those of the author and do not constitute 
in any way the position of the FAO, IGAD, the Livestock Policy Initiative nor the 
governments studied.  
 
 
David K. Leonard 
Research Director 
Institute of Development Studies (Sussex) 
 
Date of publication: 2007. 
 iv
 
ABBREVIATIONS AND LOCAL TERMS 
ASALs Arid and Semi-Arid Lands 
ALRMP Arid Lands Resource Management Project 
AU-IBAR African Union – Inter-Africa Bureau for Animal Resources 
CAHWs Community Animal Health Workers 
CEMRIDE Center for Minority Rights Development 
CEWARN Conflict Early Warning Network 
CKRC Constitution of Kenya Review Commission 
CSO Civil Society Organization 
DFID Department for International Development (of the British Government) 
DFRD District Focus for Rural Development 
ERSWEC Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation 
EU European Union 
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GOK Government of Kenya 
IED Institute for Education and Development 
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
ILRI International Livestock Research Institute 
IQAM Improving Quality Assurance in Milk Markets  
IPAR Institute of Policy Analysis and Research 
 v 
KANU Kenya African National Union 
KARI Kenya Agricultural Research Institute 
KCC Kenya Cooperative Creameries 
KDB Kenya Dairy Board 
KLA Kenya Land Association 
KMC Kenya Meat Commission 
KPF Kenya Pastoralist Forum 
KVB Kenya Veterinary Board 
LPI Livestock Policy Initiative 
MoLFD Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries Development 
MP Member of Parliament 
NARC National Rainbow Coalition 
NCC National Constitutional Conference 
NEP North Eastern Province 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
OP Office of the President 
PPG Pastoralist Parliamentary Group 
PPLPI Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Initiative (FAO) 
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
PS Permanent Secretary 
RVF Rift Valley Fever 
SDP Small-holder Dairy Project 
 vi
SIDA Swedish International Development Agency 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
 vii 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Livestock are crucial to the economy of Kenya, where their production contributes over 
12% of total Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Kenya’s livestock sector is one of the best-
organized in the region, and the number of dairy cattle exceeds that of any other country 
in Africa (Leksmono et al. 2006). Despite the sector’s relative success, however, the 
overwhelming majority of Kenya’s 8m livestock producers are among the poorest people 
in Kenya. In the dairy industry, approximately 86% of milk produced comes from 600,000 
small-holder households, usually with just one or two cows (ibid). The situation is worse 
for many pastoral producers, most of who live in the extremely difficult conditions of 
northern Kenya, where they face low rainfall, frequent drought and increasing 
desertification, as well as a history of marginalization by the central government in 
service and infrastructure provision and economic opportunity. 
Many of the disfunctionalities and anti-poor biases of the livestock sector date to the era 
of agricultural settler colonialism, during which time foreigners established laws, 
regulations and patterns of governance to benefit themselves and the Kenyan ethnicities 
living near to them in the agriculturally productive highlands. The British systematically 
neglected the less climatically temperate “low potential” areas inhabited by pastoralists, 
leaving a legacy of the lowest education and development rates in Kenya in these areas.  
Colonialism’s method of “indirect rule” also laid the foundation for a weak, divided and 
highly personalized neo-patrimonial political system, in which traditional personal rule is 
combined with formalized, professional laws and rational-legal codes of conduct. The 
result has been a state with high levels of ethnic-based clientelism and corruption, as well 
as a history of making national economic decisions based on political logics, particularly 
during the Moi years (1978-2002). This political situation is significant for how policy 
related to the livestock sector has been made. The centralization of power in the 
presidency and the workings of patron-client politics have tended to exacerbate neglect 
for both predominantly pastoralist areas and the livestock-dependent poor generally. 
Pastoralist groups have never played much more than a marginal role in the ethnic 
coalition-building that drives politics, and have been increasingly alienated from their 
most vital resource, land. The lack of development in pastoralist areas has also resulted 
in higher levels of insecurity, with violent inter-ethnic and cross-border cattle rustling.  
Thus, considerable constraints to livelihood improvement exist for Kenya’s poor livestock 
producers. In addition to those already mentioned, they are limited by:  
• weak governance and one of the highest levels of corruption in the world. 
• a politically marginal and weak livestock Ministry (MoLFD).  
• an overly complex dairy regulation and licensing system that strongly favors large-scale 
producers and processors over their poor, small-holder counterparts.  
• incomplete markets and poor marketing systems for meat and live animals. 
• low integration of small-holders into high-profit, formal production systems.  
• lack of service provision and infrastructure in pastoralist areas combined with 
repeatedly thwarted efforts by Members of Parliament (MPs) to lobby for change. 
• outdated policies, regulations and laws, combined with exceedingly sluggish policy 
reform processes that are often stalled by the politically powerful. 
• a land administration system that has gradually reduced the viability of the pastoral 
lifestyle by alienating pastoralists from their land. 
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Many Kenyans thought this difficult environment for poor livestock producers would 
change quickly after the democratic change of power in 2002, yet many feel that politics 
continues as before. Despite this cynicism, political as well as economic liberalization 
have in fact led to several major changes that have opened potential doors for pro-poor 
reforms. These changes include: the electoral contestation for pastoralist votes, which 
increases their political salience; the growth and maturing of activist civil society 
development; a slow but gradual acceptance of pastoralism as a viable livelihood; the 
growing power of the legislative branch of government vis-à-vis the executive; and the 
rise in respect for evidence-based policymaking.  
These openings in Kenya’s political space make the following four policy or institutional 
changes most feasible for helping the livestock-dependent poor:  
• support to the Pastoralist Parliamentary Group (PPG): The current time period in 
Kenya is an excellent moment in which to attempt to formalize and build capacity in 
the PPG, a currently-informal grouping of MPs from pastoralist areas, as pastoralist 
issues are gaining political salience in the run-up to the 2007 national elections, and as 
MPs gain increasing autonomy from the executive.  
• improvements for Small-holder Dairy Producers: For the first time in decades, the 
formal dairy sector environment appears to be moving toward acceptance and 
integration of small-holder production. Several considerable de facto changes have 
been made towards recognition of small-scale marketing including the introduction of 
an improved Dairy Bill, suggesting that more formal legal or regulatory reforms may 
not meet major opposition.  
• collaboration and Capacity-Building with Kenyan Civil Society: The Kenyan voluntary 
sector is the strongest in the IGAD region, and IGAD LPI should network with Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) on research 
and policy change advocacy. With the opening of political space in Kenya, CSOs have 
forcefully vocalized their critiques of government programs and actions that affect the 
livestock dependent poor, and this is likely only to increase in the future. Even when 
the government is wary of civil society actors, it has increasingly taken a participatory 
approach to them, even in the policy-making process, and IGAD LPI should take 
advantage of their position and local knowledge.  
• attempt at Insecurity Reduction: Insecurity among pastoralist groups was the most 
frequently cited livestock-related problem in Kenya, and is therefore a priority. 
Searching for commonalities between pastoralist communities and MPs, strengthening 
cross-border initiatives like the Conflict Early Warning and Response Network 
(CEWARN), and increasing service and infrastructure provision in pastoralist areas are 
necessary.  
IGAD LPI may also engage in policy reform on land reform, animal marketing and exports 
and Community Animal Health Workers (CAHWs), though the authors believe these to be 
more difficult areas of intervention. 
Keywords 
Kenya, livestock, policymaking, trade, development, rural development, pastoralism, 
poverty. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Kenya, a country of approximately 34 million people, has the third-largest economy in 
sub-Saharan Africa, growing democracy, and a relatively well-developed livestock sector, 
with more dairy cattle than anywhere else in Africa, and higher milk consumption than 
any other developing country in the world (Leksmono et al. 2006). The agricultural sector 
broadly contributes over 30 percent of GDP annually, over 50 percent of foreign currency 
income, and employment for just under 75 percent of the population. Within the sector, 
dairy production contributes 3.5 percent of GDP, comprising 14 percent of agricultural 
GDP (Hooten 2004). In processing, dairy is the most advanced of the livestock sub-sectors, 
with 34 companies producing over 600,000 liters of milk per day. Livestock production, 
including these dairy figures, comprises 47 percent of agricultural GDP and over 12 
percent of total GDP, making it a crucial part of the economy.1  
Despite the sector’s relative success, however, the overwhelming majority of the 
country’s 8m livestock producers are among the poorest people in the continent, and 
often have the lowest standards of living in Kenya. In the dairy industry, for example, 
approximately 86 percent of milk produced in Kenya comes from over 600,000 small-
holder households – often farms with just one or two milk cows (Leksmono et al. 2006). 
The situation is worse for many pastoral producers, most of whom live as pastoralists in 
the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs) of northern Kenya, where living conditions are 
extremely difficult with low rainfall, frequent drought and increasing desertification, as 
well as a history of marginalization by the central government in service and 
infrastructure provision and economic opportunity. 
Livestock producers therefore face considerable constraints in achieving a satisfactory 
standard of living from their livelihood, although dairy farmers, even small ones, do 
better than pastoralists. They remain limited by: neglect by the central government 
despite the large role livestock plays in the economy, poor governance and high 
corruption, a politically marginal and weak Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries 
Development (MoLFD)2, incomplete markets and poor marketing systems, outdated 
policies and laws governing their sector, little access to natural and financial resources, 
insecurity and in some cases low-level civil conflict, and high HIV/AIDS prevalence. 
The primary objective of this paper is to understand how IGAD LPI can assist Kenya’s 
livestock-dependent poor to overcome these obstacles through policy or institutional 
interventions. To do so, the analytic tools of political science have been used to conduct 
political feasibility assessments of pro-poor policy options. The aim is to determine 
policies that will be truly feasible in the real-world political context of Kenya, not merely 
those that are just promising on a technical or hypothetic level. Thus, the authors identify 
key national and international actors, institutions and processes and their role in policy-
making relevant to livestock, the institutional bases of existing policies, and finally 
strategies and resources required to make these changes and creations possible. 
 
In order to accomplish these goals, the authors conducted six weeks of in-country field-
work between May and July 2006, supplemented with a thorough review of government 
                                                 
1 According to FAO (2005, 3), there are approximately 11.5m cattle, 18.6m small ruminants, 332,000 pigs and 27.9m chickens in 
the country. 
2 This statement is not meant to pass judgment on the MoLFD or to suggest that there was any overt political action made to 
marginalize it. It is meant only to explain that MoLFD is not one of the more powerful ministries within the Kenyan system. It is a 
relative new Ministry, having been separated from the Ministry of Agriculture, and remains under-funded, according to Kenyan 
government informants.  
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documents, newspapers, academic journals and recently published research on the 
livestock sector in Kenya. We have relied foremost upon the informed observer method of 
research, conducting over 40 interviews with individuals who are in a position to 
understand the political economy of the sector, including the processes that shape its 
policies and their reform. Interviews were held with those in the government, the donor 
community, non-governmental organizations, academia, and the leadership of relevant 
livestock and other civil society organizations. Field trips were also conducted to a 
number of key sites throughout the country to allow the researchers to talk to some 
livestock producers firsthand.  
At present, the authors find that several major changes, fueled largely by political 
liberalization, have helped to open potential doors for pro-poor livestock policy change, 
in some cases after years of neglect and marginalization by the central government. 
These changes include the governmental change in power, the growth and maturing of 
activist civil society and NGO development, a slow but gradual acceptance of pastoralism 
as a viable livelihood in the ASALs, the growing power of the legislative branch of 
government vis-à-vis the executive, and the rise in respect for evidence-based 
policymaking. These developments, all of which will be discussed in detail in this report, 
will all help to make the changes recommended to the IGAD LPI in this report more easily 
implemented. 
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PART I: THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN KENYA AND THE LIVESTOCK 
INDUSTRY 
British Colonial Heritage 
While Kenya has been independent for over 40 years, many of the disfunctionalities and 
anti-poor biases of the livestock sector date to the colonial period, making discussion of 
colonialism still relevant today. British colonialism in Kenya spanned approximately 80 
years, beginning in the 1880s and lasting until independence in 1963. Colonialism in Kenya 
was implemented largely on a settler basis, with foreigners establishing large mixed farms 
(including dairy), extensive ranches, and tea and coffee estates in the most hospitable 
and fertile areas of the country. This had a profound impact on livestock rearing, land use 
patterns, policy and public administration, the impact of which continued after 
independence and still affects the livestock sector today. 
For example, British colonialism emphasized building strong institutions and productive 
economic enterprises in the “White Highlands” – the areas of European settlement near 
Nairobi and throughout the agriculturally productive “high potential,” high-elevation 
parts of the country. In these areas, they created a relatively developed dairy industry, 
importing exotic high-yielding cows and often cross-breeding them with local animals for 
disease and climate resistance. To do this, they developed a successful artificial 
insemination program and veterinary service as part of the colonial administrative 
services, which were quite well developed and professionalized by the time of 
independence. They also implemented land policies allowing settlers to appropriate vast 
tracks of the country’s best farm land, while resettling many Africans native to these 
areas into reserves. Finally, they invested heavily in infrastructure and, as colonialism 
went on, education of the Africans native to the highlands. 
In favoring the highlands, British colonialism systematically neglected more remote, less 
climatically temperate, “low potential” areas – particularly the ASALs of the northern 
two-thirds of the country, which were inhabited largely by nomadic pastoralists.3 During 
colonialism, these areas received little attention, and as a result, little educational 
development, civil service administration, and infrastructure – thereby setting the stage 
for difficulties for pastoralists in the post-independence era. 
Livestock-related policies during colonialism thus thoroughly benefited European settlers 
at the expense of most native Kenyans. For example, until the 1950s, native Kenyans 
were barred from participating in the dairy industry, and both the Dairy Industry Act of 
1958 and licensing regulation for urban milk sales were designed to protect the interests 
of large-scale settler dairy farmers. Similarly, the dual system of land regulation, in which 
English law was used in settler areas and native custom in the African Reserves, allowed 
the colonialists to expropriate the most productive land in the country. Moreover, during 
colonialism, the Governor of the colony, assisted by the Commissioner of Lands, had sole 
authority to grant land rights. While they were required to allocate land so as to benefit 
the “public interest,” this was often loosely interpreted to the benefit of the wealthy 
European settlers. Finally, as mentioned above, education opportunities, infrastructure, 
                                                 
3 ASALs as a whole also include some areas of low rainfall sedentary agriculture, such as those of Ukambani. In this paper, when 
we discuss ASALs, however, we are usually stressing pastoralist systems. 
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public goods and services, and animal and human health facilities were directed towards 
areas in which they would benefit settler populations. 
Post-independence Political Dynamics 
Kenya’s colonial heritage paved the way for the country’s post-independence neo-
patrimonial political and policy dynamics, which continue to affect the Kenyan livestock 
sector. Colonial rule in Kenya, as in much of the rest of Africa, involved the employment 
and cooptation of traditional African leaders and other administrative middlemen in a 
form of indirect rule or “decentralized despotism” that was both inexpensive and allowed 
European personnel to be thin on the ground (Mamdani 1996). This laid the foundation for 
a weak, divided and highly personalized post-independent state: a “near perfect 
example” of neo-patrimonialism, in which traditional personal rule is combined with 
formalized, professional laws and rational-legal codes of conduct (Barkan et al. 2003). 
Adding insult to injury, colonial administrative structures, rules and laws, which were not 
seen as legitimate institutions by most native Kenyans during colonialism, were adopted 
nearly wholesale at independence, partly because newly powerful leaders directly 
benefited from them in much the same ways that their colonial predecessors had. While 
in Kenya for many years public administration was much stronger than in most of Africa, 
the legacy of illegitimate, foreign institutions meant that the notions of citizenship and 
nationalism did not fully develop. Instead, it has been considered legitimate to use the 
government for the good of the self and kinship groups – and it has become the norm to 
distribute goods and services as the means of gaining compliance with the state. Kenyan 
leaders have found it difficult to maintain their power and authority without resorting to 
ethnic-based clientage, personalism and reliance on informal arrangements. 
Thus, clientelism in Kenya after colonialism has tended to take an ethnic and regional 
dimension, with individual politicians considered personally responsible for delivering 
goods and services to their ethnic brethren. During the Kenyatta administration (1964-
1978), public administration was fairly strong, particularly in former settler areas. These 
areas and those educated, however, were disproportionately Kikuyu and other highland 
ethnicities, since colonialism concentrated development in the areas where these groups 
lived. This it was initially easy for Kenyatta to favor his ethnic group since they usually 
were the best qualified candidates. While Kenyatta is considered to have tempered his 
favoritism and maintained stability both by allowing loyal local leaders of other 
ethnicities a degree of power in their localities and by carefully balancing his Cabinet and 
the benefits associated with it along ethnic lines, near the end of his administration, the 
Kikuyu were unduly favored, causing considerable tensions between ethnicities. 
This highly unstable political system, which became considerably more exaggerated 
during the Moi administration (1978-2002), also had catastrophic economic consequences. 
In order to maintain political stability and loyalty to the regime, Kenya’s leaders have 
often made economic decisions following distributional political – not rational economic – 
logic (Bates 1981). For example, at the same time as he decried “tribalism” in Kenya, Moi 
pursued “ethnic balancing” policies both to remove Kikuyu control of the administration 
and to “reward and punish” various areas of the country. This, combined with an 
increasingly frequent shuffling of key allies into positions from which rents could be easily 
drawn, resulted in a major erosion of quality in the civil service and administration in the 
country (Barkan et al. 2003). Only occasionally did this significantly help people in 
nomadic areas, as when Moi used a quota system to lower admission standards for those 
from pastoralist backgrounds (Livingstone 2005). 
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To maintain control, Moi also further centralized power during his 24-year rule. The 
combination of these policies resulted in Kenya having one of the world’s most corrupt 
systems by the end of his regime, according to global corruption watchdog Transparency 
International (Transparency International 2002). Many thought the situation would change 
upon the democratic change of power in 2002, with Mwai Kibaki’s new coalition able to 
turn the country around. Unfortunately, however, Kibaki has included many “old guard” 
politicians from the Moi and Kenyatta administrations in his cabinet and most agree that 
patronage politics continues as before4. This endemic corruption remains one of the 
biggest obstacles to policy change in Kenya, as nearly any alteration to the status quo 
removes at least some access to state resources for the already-powerful. 
Not surprisingly, clientelist politics have also resulted in highly ethnicized electoral 
politics, with political parties tending to be organized on an ethnic basis, with virtually no 
ideological basis. Tensions along these lines became violent during the 1992 and 1997 
presidential elections, when Moi fomented political-ethnic strain in the Rift Valley, 
resulting in over 2000 deaths. On the parliamentary level, constituencies tend to be very 
small, usually populated by members of only one group, who expect that their MP will use 
his/her power to gain access to state resources for their group. As Barkan et al. (2003, 6) 
write it in their review of the Kenyan political system: 
Stated simply, the objective of politics is to control the state for the purpose of 
funneling state resources back to one’s supporters and local communities. Politics 
is local and patronage is usually king. The result, is that political leaders invariably 
view most issues of public policy through a “distributional” lens by asking the 
question: “what will this policy bring to my constituency?” Great effort is devoted 
to securing a school, health clinic, water system or road for one’s local community. 
Less effort is spent on issues from which there are no or few distributional 
payoffs. Voters also evaluate their leaders from the same perspective. Those who 
“deliver the goods” back to the rural constituency are supported for reelection, 
while those who have not are voted out. 
Thus the politics of neo-patrimonialism, including clientelism, personalism, corruption, 
distributional logics for gaining compliance and politically – but not always economically – 
rational economic decision-making have combined to make for a unique and difficult 
arena in which to attempt pro-poor livestock policy change. 
The Legacy of Colonialism and Neo-Patrimonialism on the Livestock 
Sector 
Colonialism, and 40 years of neo-patrimonial rule in Kenya, have has had a significant 
impact on the way in which policies related to the livestock sector have been made. For 
example, the centralization of power in the presidency and the workings of patron-client 
politics, especially during the Moi administration, have tended to exacerbate the colonial 
heritage of neglect for both the predominantly pastoralist ASALs and the livestock-
dependent poor generally. As a result, the ASALs have been largely neglected when 
patronage is distributed from the center. 
 
                                                 
4 For more information on changes during the Kibaki Administration, see the section below entitled “Political Liberalization” in 
Part II: Policy-making Since Liberalization: Pro-Poor Policy Change?” 
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Furthermore, predominantly pastoralist areas have never played more than a marginal 
role in the ethnic coalition-building that drives politics. Despite the fact that Moi was 
himself from a pastoralist background and used this fact to gain KANU party and personal 
allegiance from most pastoralist regions and their individual MPs, he tended to employ 
divisive measures to prevent pastoralists from banding together to promote their 
collective interests. Instead, he promoted key individuals from pastoralist backgrounds to 
prominent positions, thereby maintaining the support of their constituents isolated from 
larger pastoralist commonalities and interests. By manipulating individual benefits in this 
way, he was largely able to avoid spending scarce government resources on expansive 
pastoralist development policies. 
Moreover, the “low potential” economic label has continued for the predominantly 
pastoralist ASALs, making them remain economically, and therefore, politically 
unimportant in post-colonial times. Those in power have not recognized short-term 
incentives for investing in the ASALs through service provision (IMF 2005), and government 
services like health, roads, drinking water and education have continued to be 
concentrated in the “high potential” highlands. For this reason, ASAL pastoralists are 
among the least educated members of Kenyan society, and the ASAL poverty rate of 65 
percent is 13 percent higher than the national average of 52 percent (FAO 2005). 
Insufficient development resources leading to a dearth of alternate livelihood 
opportunities have also resulted in higher levels of insecurity in many pastoralist areas, 
where inter-ethnic and cross-border cattle rustling has become increasingly violent in 
recent years. North Eastern Province (NEP) is particularly under-developed, and was 
actually “closed” or under a state of emergency for much of the post-independence 
period. Ethnic politicking has in particular led to a bias against predominantly-Muslim 
Somalis, who make up between a quarter and a third of the pastoralist population. 
In addition, many of the laws and regulations relating to livestock have remained intact 
since colonial times. For example, dairy regulation is still largely based on the 1958 dairy 
act, which favored large-scale farms supplying urban centers – and not the small-scale 
producers who now comprise 86 percent of production (hooten 2004). In general, it is the 
politically well-connected who have very large dairy farms and have benefited from this 
policy.5 even more significantly, land administration and policy have changed very little 
since the colonial policies of the 1950s, with “disastrous” consequences (marongwe & 
palmer 2004). While land administration reform has been suggested numerous times in 
the independence era, the power to allocate lands, as outlined in the government lands 
act, remains extremely centralized in the hands of the president and the commissioner of 
lands – in the same way as it was with the governor during colonialism. An extremely 
opaque system without accountability, land allocation has been easily abused, often at 
the expense of the livestock-dependent poor. According to the minister for lands and 
settlement, “land has been used as a pay-back system for political supporters, though 
limited to certain groups of people.” (ti-kenya 2003) 
                                                 
5 For example, the Kenyatta family owns the Brookside Dairy, one of the largest processors in Kenya. 
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PART II: POLICY-MAKING SINCE LIBERALIZATION: PRO-POOR POLICY 
CHANGES? 
 
While livestock policy in the independence era has been largely path dependent, based on 
laws, regulations and patterns established during colonialism, several important changes 
have occurred since the mid-1980s to bring about the possibility for alterations in these 
policies. Liberalization, both economic and political, has played a particularly strong role 
in changing the course of policy direction pertaining to livestock. 
Economic Liberalization 
For most of the post-independence era, the Kenyan government followed a policy of high 
state involvement in the economy, which exacerbated the colonial-based skewed 
economic gains from the livestock sector, as key government positions controlling the 
dairy and meat industries were used as patronage-based prebends6, and politically 
powerful producers were able to use their connections for economic benefit. By the 
middle of the Moi administration, however, poor economic management and high 
corruption, combined with declining world market prices for Kenya’s main exports, 
created fiscal crisis. As in most developing countries, Kenya was urged to take a path of 
economic liberalization to manage the crisis and get the economy back on track. Many of 
the liberalization measures have been strongly resisted by the Kenyan government, yet 
donors continue to push for these actions. In the livestock sector, several key policy 
changes were made.  
First, the veterinary system was largely privatized, removing subsidies for artificial 
insemination and veterinary services. While this was effective in places close to Nairobi 
and in much of Central Province, where the dairy industry is strong, it has been much less 
so in other areas of the country. Prices have become prohibitive for some users, artificial 
insemination services are extremely difficult to access, and private veterinarians are out 
of reach to many. This is the case for much of the pastoralist north, as it is difficult and 
costly to induce highly educated veterinarians to live in these remote, service-poor areas. 
 One proposed solution has been to provide tax breaks for veterinarians willing to work in 
these areas. The use of Community-based Animal Health Workers (CAHWs) has also been 
widely accepted as a means to provide services in these areas,7 although some private 
and government-based veterinarians still appear threatened by or otherwise opposed to 
their use, as there is no way to verify their professional skills and ethics. It has been 
suggested that the Kenyan Government and the Kenyan Veterinary Board (KVB) further 
the acceptance of CAHWs by creating a formal recognition and accreditation process for 
those trained according to nationally developed standards (Cinnamond & Eregae 2003).  
 
                                                 
6 Prebends are revocable grants of rights to particular income streams. 
7 According to a recent survey on the use of CAHWs in Kenya, 65.3% of pastoralist respondents in West Pokot, 98.3% in Wajir and 
100% in Marsabit had received treatment from CAHWs for their livestock. In these areas, the competitors to CAHWs are not 
professional veterinarians, but black market vendors and dukas, or small kiosks, selling veterinary medicines (Cinnamond & 
Eregae, 2003). 
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Besides animal health service privatization, liberalization also greatly impacted the dairy 
and meat industries, both of which were state controlled by monopsony marketing 
boards, the Kenya Cooperative Creameries (KCC) and the Kenya Meat Commission (KMC), 
respectively. Liberalization sounded the death knell for these ungainly parastatals. In the 
dairy sector, liberalization progressed slowly beginning in the early 1980s, as competitor 
licenses were given in 1983 and 1986, followed by parastatal reform, reduced government 
spending and finally, milk price deregulation in 1992, after which KCC slowly collapsed.  
After 60 years controlling the milk industry, the gap left by KCC was quickly filled by 
informal small-scale producers and several large, licensed and regulated processors. This 
situation is sufficient to provide most Kenyans with milk, although the small-scale 
producers are usually unlicensed and unregulated. While they have in many cases formed 
cooperatives to sell their milk to large processors, they do not reap high profits from 
these arrangements, and have instead begun to sell more directly to consumers at 
informal “milk bars.” The competition caused by this informal sales arrangement caused 
considerable discord between the small and large-scale producers, though policy-related 
efforts to alleviate this issue are being considered, including the formal recognition of 
small-scale producers, their training in sanitary standards, and the creation of a new 
Dairy Bill. These will be discussed in more detail later in this report. 
While the dairy industry in Kenya has remained largely successful and exports milk to 
much of Southern and Eastern Africa, the liberalization of the meat industry has not met 
with similar private success – so much so that the GOK reopened a state-owned KMC in 
2006. The old KMC was “one of the worst cases of mismanagement of state corporations” 
(Mogusu & Kathuri 2006), and – partially due to its conflicting aspirations to provide both 
buyer-of-last-resort welfare services to pastoralists and to make a profit – was unable to 
compete with local abattoirs once the meat industry was privatized. Informants now hope 
the new KMC will provide a more stable way for ASAL pastoralists to sell their animals, 
though the conflicting goals of profitability, equity and welfare service remain. 
Proponents of the new KMC also hope it will allow Kenya to access the recently reopened 
live animal and corned beef markets in Saudi Arabia, which could prove profitable for 
poor producers, although the KMC’s focus on corned beef may reflect unrealistic 
expectations about global demand for this product.8 Moreover, many fear that the KMC 
will quickly sink back into mismanagement and is merely a ploy by the Kenyan 
Government to please ASAL voters ahead of the 2007 elections. The government has 
pledged to privatize the KMC after two years of operations. These issues will also be 
discussed in more detail later in the paper. 
Finally, and related to the KMC, liberalization of the meat industry also meant 
liberalization of quarantine facilities in Kenya – which many now believe to have been a 
mistake, as there is no longer enough regulation. In its heyday throughout the 1970s, 
Kenya exported meat throughout the world, maintaining access to key markets in Europe 
and the Arabian Peninsula. In fact, the livestock trade brought in $32m in 1980, whereas 
it is now down to only $6m (FAO 2005, 12). These markets eventually closed to Kenyan 
exports due to insufficient ability of the Kenyan government to police quarantine zones 
and the related refusal of cattle ranchers to respect them (Leonard 1991), but could, in 
principle, be re-opened if Kenya develops quarantine facilities that it are able to monitor 
and regulate reliably and convincingly. In fact, the newly reopened KMC, along with other 
potential Kenyan exporters, was initially granted export rights to the very lucrative Saudi 
Arabian market in late 2006, but a new outbreak of Rift Valley Fever (RVF) prevented the 
market from opening. This being said, it is worth noting that most of Kenya’s export grade 
beef is produced not by pastoralists, but large cattle ranchers, meaning efforts to 
                                                 
8 KMC was a large provider of corned beef to Europe during World War II, when European countries faced food shortages. It would 
appear as though the current desire to export this product may not reflect changed market conditions since that time.  
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improve beef exports will only assist poor producers indirectly, or those who work on the 
large ranches. Pastoralists do provide small ruminants for export, however, which are also 
prone to RVF and other diseases that make quarantining necessary.  
Thus, to maintain access to valuable markets, the Kenyan Government will have to 
reassert its role in the regulation and provision of quarantining services through the 
Department of Veterinary Services (DVS) and by coordinating disease control measures 
and border surveillance with neighboring countries. In recent years, DVS has been limited 
by restricted funding, but with the advent of the re-opened KMC and Saudi markets, the 
government has pledged to increase this funding. It remains to be seen, however, 
whether DVS will ever be truly successful in asserting quarantine controls over well-
connected large ranchers, as it has not been so in the past.  
Political Liberalization 
The 1990s witnessed not only the start of liberalization in the economy, but also in the 
political sphere, where multi-party presidential elections have now taken place three 
times, in 1992, 1997 and 2002. The last of these elections resulted in the first electoral 
change in power in Kenya’s history, with Mwai Kibaki of the new NARC coalition party 
defeating the KANU candidate, first-president Kenyatta’s son and Moi’s hand-picked 
successor, Uhuru Kenyatta.  
Significantly for pastoralist populations in the country, the 2002 election was the first in 
which pastoralists were courted by multiple parties. In prior elections, the ruling party 
KANU was the only party with enough funds to launch a successful campaign in the rugged 
and remote territory where most pastoralists live, yet in 2002, the NARC manifesto 
singled out pastoral development as one of its core commitments. While KANU retained 
27 of the 39 pastoralist seats in parliament, the competition for their votes suggests that 
pastoralist concerns will become increasingly difficult to sideline as time progresses. 
Chances are good that these poor livestock producers will again be crucial in the 
upcoming elections, making 2007 a key time for the current government to make 
improvements in these areas. 
 This change of power after forty years of KANU control brought a euphoric sense of 
possibility to the people of Kenya. Since 2002, a handful of small yet potentially 
significant changes have occurred within the political system and civil society that may 
open the door for more pro-poor policy choices in the livestock sector. 
Livestock Policy Environment Changes 
Civil Society Development  
One of the most significant changes that has occurred in the policy environment has been 
the blossoming of civil society organizations and both local and foreign development NGOs 
under the new government. While many of these organizations’ leaders are quick to point 
out that the development of civil society truly started during the final Moi administration, 
they also note that the Kibaki government has made a concerted effort at participatory 
and consultative processes involving their organizations in policy development. This has 
happened or is happening in many sectors, including several relevant to livestock. As will 
be discussed in more detail in the following sections, NGOs became quite highly involved 
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in the drafting of a new Dairy Bill, the draft National Policy for the Sustainable 
Development of Arid and Semi-Arid Lands of Kenya, the proposed constitution’s land 
management chapter, and the draft National Land Policy. They have also been highly 
vocal in expressing dissatisfaction with the state of corruption and administrative 
mismanagement in the country, putting pressure on the current government for change. 
The Kenyan voluntary sector is now stronger than in any other IGAD country.  
Gradual Acceptance that Pastoralism is a Viable Lifestyle for the ASALs 
Perhaps partially due to the work of pro-poor NGOs and CSOs mentioned above, a small 
but discernible change in public opinion – among politicians and non-politicians alike – has 
begun to occur whereby old prejudices against pastoralism as a viable economic activity 
have weakened somewhat. At least some policy-makers have begun to view pastoralism as 
a viable economic enterprise in arid and semi-arid lands. Consequently, overt policy 
biases from the past that aimed to bring pastoralists into the towns and cities and to 
force them to “modernize” by adopting other, supposedly more appropriate, ways of life, 
have given way to a greater understanding that pastoralism can be viable.  
This change has been reflected in some of the GOK’s policy and planning documents in 
the past several years, including the country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan (IMF 2005) 
and Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation (ERSWEC), which 
call for an ASAL development program as one of its specific “poverty targeted programs.” 
To this end, the Government has enlarged its Arid Lands Resource Management Project 
(ALRMP), based in the Office of the President and funded by the World Bank. 9 The ALRMP 
aims to improve natural resource and drought management, build capacity at the 
community level and strengthen service provision at the local level in education, health, 
livestock production, marketing and health and agricultural services.10 As discussed in 
more detail elsewhere in this report, the government has also recently re-opened the 
KMC, with the stated objective of uplifting the standards of living among pastoralists in 
the ASALs.  
While these developments are certainly a move in the right direction for poor livestock 
producers in the ASALs, implying that the current government will be open to pastoralist 
assistance, there is still some question as to how serious the Government really is about 
their development. For example, it has yet to pass the Draft National Policy for the 
Sustainable Development of Arid and Semi-Arid Lands of Kenya, which was written in 
2004, and many believe that both the ALRMP and the KMC re-opening serve specifically as 
tools to garner political support, not as truly pro-poor minded development efforts.  
Growing Power of Parliament vis-à-vis the Executive 
A third and potentially path-breaking change in Kenyan politics lies in the growing 
strength and autonomy of the parliament vis-à-vis the executive. As Kenya continues to 
liberalize and democratize, there are signs that parliament may have begun to garner 
more power over policymaking and the general affairs of the country than in the past.  
 
Perhaps the most significant change in parliament since 2002 lies in the dramatic increase 
in MP salaries, now at $5,000 a month, over seven times the previous formal 
                                                 
9 This is not meant to imply that this is the first ASAL development program in Kenya, only that the current government has 
formally renewed commitment to these areas. In fact, the Government of Kenya had some successful ASAL programs in the early 
1980s (Leonard 1991). 
10 The program works in the following ASAL Districts of Kenya: Baringo, Garissa, Ijara, Isiolo, Kajiado, Kitui, Laikipia, Makueni, 
Mandera, Marsabit, Mbeere, Moyale, Mwingi, Narok, Nyeri-Kieni, Samburu, Tana River, Tharaka, Transmara, Turkana, Wajir and 
West Pokot.  
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compensation. In principle, this new pay level, one of the highest in the world, should 
free MPs from reliance on state patronage and make them less beholden to the executive. 
This does not signal the end of patronage in the country altogether, as constituents still 
expect their representatives to provide largess, whether it comes from their salaries or 
from executive-derived patronage. Without the need to cozy up to the executive for 
these funds, however, the MPs should prove more independent. The limited evidence 
available suggests that this is the case.  
Legislators have furthered their quest for autonomy by successfully pushing for 
decentralization and devolution of power in the way of Constituency Development Funds – 
generous funding for development enterprises at the local level that are controlled by 
committees of local authorities and civil society organizations under the leadership of the 
MPs. These funds are intended to de-personalize the flow of development funds, to lower 
patronage politics and to increase accountability by bringing funding decisions closer to 
the people – though they have been critiqued for merely bringing patronage to lower 
levels, as gross mismanagement of funds has already been reported in some places. It is 
unlikely that the combination of increased salaries and Constituency Funds will root out 
patronage politics altogether, but it will certainly alter the dynamics of neo-patrimonial 
politics and allow at least some MPs to act more autonomously from the executive. 
Finally, many MPs have been pushing for both increased devolution and more power for 
the parliament in the quest for a new Constitution of Kenya. The most visible and 
controversial sign of this was the attempt to create an executive Prime Minister position, 
which would remove considerable power from the presidential office. While cynics argue 
that these changes were merely a way for parliamentarians to get more control over state 
resources for their own purposes, the balancing of power among the various branches of 
government could only be a good thing for Kenya. It is worth noting, however, that the 
draft constitution rejected by voters in a heated November 2005 referendum created only 
a non-executive Prime Minister and fewer levels of devolution than hoped for, suggesting 
that those benefiting from highly concentrated power hold considerable sway in the 
creation of new policies. Considering that the parliament did pass this draft constitution, 
we might also question how serious the MPs really are about increasing parliament’s 
relative power. On the bright side, however, Kenyan democracy is strong enough for the 
failed referendum to hold, suggesting that changes can still be made in the future.  
While controversial, the increase in MP salaries, the formalization of their influence over 
Constituency Development Fund and the push for more parliamentary power in the 
Constitution may have begun to free them from the patronage of the executive in ways 
unimaginable during the Kenyatta and Moi eras. This might open avenues for the 
improvement of livestock policy and for pro-poor policy-making, in general. Moreover, the 
new generation of MPs appears – at least according to many sources – more interested in 
executive oversight than previous MPs. While various observers differ as to how they 
assess the degree to which changes in parliament constitute any real move from neo-
patrimonial politics, signs point to at least some positive change. 
Case Study: The Pastoralist Parliamentary Group 
The rise of the Pastoralist Parliamentary Group (PPG), an informal grouping of 
approximately 30 MPs from pastoralist areas aimed at improving policy towards the 
ASALs,11 demonstrates clearly both the potentialities and pitfalls of increasing MP 
autonomy. Fundamentally, the rise of the PPG brings hope that these parliamentarians 
will be able to place pastoralist issues on the policy-making agenda by providing a forum 
for collective action among pastoralists. Realistically, however, the Kenyan PPG – like its 
                                                 
11 Of Kenya’s 210 parliamentary constituencies, 39 can be considered to be located in pastoralist areas (Livingstone 2005). 
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counterparts in Uganda and Ethiopia – remains informal, weak in capacity and internally 
divided along lines of region, ethnicity and religion. Nevertheless, the PPG has been able 
to bring pastoralist issues onto the radar in small ways and may, in the future, offer 
pastoralists a strong voice in the parliament.  
The PPG has a long history marked by false-starts and opposition from old-guard 
politicians – Moi in particular. Its first incarnation was short lived: during the 7th 
Parliament (1992-1997) a group of MPs from the much marginalized North Eastern 
Province (NEP) formed an informal organization to raise awareness and support for 
pastoralist and ASAL issues among MPs. However, after only several months of its 
attempts to influence parliament, Moi successfully thwarted the group’s existence. This 
was necessary for Moi since his strength lay in the ability to keep constituencies and MPs 
personally loyal to him, yet divided among themselves. The PPG movement to raise 
political consciousness and find common causes between very diverse communities and 
across party lines was a serious threat to his power (Livingstone 2005, 22).  
While the first attempt at pastoralist unity failed, during the 8th Parliament, a new group 
bringing together pastoralist MPs from across the country arose, largely through the 
leadership of Turkana Central MP, Ekwee Ethuro. Ethuro had previously been a member of 
the Kenya Pastoralist Forum (KPF), an NGO umbrella group pushing a pro-pastoralist 
agenda. The new group proved less ephemeral than the last and embarked quickly on a 
series of visits to pastoralist areas after which they created policy documents specific to 
the needs and interests of each area. Unfortunately, the nascent PPG lacked the capacity 
to create a true advocacy program, and these policy documents had little real effect. 
Those in power remained very unreceptive to the PPG agenda, and the KANU government, 
seeing it as a threat, worked quickly to undermine the PPG completely. As an 
unprecedented effort to bring pastoralism into the mainstream of Kenyan politics, the 
PPG presented a distinct threat to the markedly anti-pastoralist KANU agenda. Moreover, 
the affiliation of the PPG with KPF hurt the group’s image among many MPs, as the KPF 
was viewed as a largely Somali organization and consequently became portrayed as 
subversive and possibly even irredentist.12 
After the change of government, however, the PPG re-launched itself in 2003 with the 
help of the Center for Minority Rights Development (CEMRIDE), a local NGO. This recent 
reincarnation of the PPG continues to face many problems, but it has proven far more 
resistant than its predecessors. In sharp contrast to the earlier PPGs, this new incarnation 
spanned the country with members from 30 of 39 pastoralist districts in four provinces 
and throughout the Rift Valley, and from most of the country’s pastoralist ethnic groups. 
This helped to dispel fears of Somali irredentism and – by greatly increasing membership 
numbers – significantly bolstered its potential bargaining power. 
While the PPG remains informal, with very rare organized meetings, no permanent 
secretariat, nor a constitution, it has attempted to work as a coordinated lobbying group 
within parliament. Led informally by a core group of MPs with a sophisticated 
understanding of the most important policy issues and the processes of parliament, PPG 
MPs operate by consulting with each other informally before approaching Ministers, 
Permanent Secretaries (PSs) or members of parliamentary committees (Livingstone 2005). 
One success from these efforts was to gain budgetary funds for boarding schools in 
pastoralist areas as part of Government’s Universal Primary Education strategy. 
Although the PPG members largely appear to be sincere in their interest in improving 
quality of life and economic opportunities for their constituents, they still face several 
major challenges. The biggest of these, as for Kenya generally, is the divisive 
                                                 
12 Ethnic Somalis in Kenya, regardless of their birth or family history, are usually seen as “outsiders” by most Kenyans. This is a 
considerable added challenge for groups like the PPG. 
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ethnicisation of politics among PPG members along tribal and religious lines, which 
impedes members’ ability to see and promote their collective interests. Despite 
incredible benefits that could come from pastoralist cohesion, it is difficult for many 
groups to see beyond differences and sometimes long-standing inter-clan conflicts. This 
has become especially true in recent years with the intensification of violent inter-ethnic 
cattle raiding and banditry. Unfortunately, some MPs explicitly exploit these differences 
to win elections and are thought to be themselves behind many cattle raids, an issue that 
will be discussed in more detail in Part III of this report.  
Other problems faced by the PPG are low literacy levels, poor economic opportunities and 
general social service shortage in their home areas – pastoralist areas have the highest 
incidence of poverty in Kenya (Livingstone 2005, 2) and illiteracy rates as high as 80 
percent in some areas (ibid, 5). These often translate into the MPs themselves being 
under-educated by Kenyan standards, with less of a grasp on the complexities of policy 
and parliamentary procedure – particularly new MPs. As a result, they are often unable to 
defend their interests against powerful politicians and interest groups – this has happened 
repeatedly over land issues, as pastoralists lose their land to individuals, mining interests, 
national parks and large government schemes.  
Despite these obstacles, investment in the development of the PPG may help this group to 
overcome collective action dilemmas to advance the interests of pastoralists in Kenya. 
Specific strategic intervention measures will be discuss and analyzed in Section IV of this 
report.  
Rise in Respect for Evidence-based Policy-making 
A fourth, more nascent – and potentially more path-breaking – change involves the slow 
acceptance among politicians and other stakeholders of evidence-based policymaking, in 
which policy is made or changed due specifically to the presentation of scientific 
evidence in support of the change. While evidence-based policy decisions remain the 
exception rather then the rule, some key examples of evidence-based policy change 
suggest that the potential for more movement in this direction may be presenting itself in 
Kenya. In general, evidence-based policymaking may work in the current political climate 
only when and if: 1) the evidence in favor of pro-poor policy changes is clear and 
overwhelming; 2) stakeholders directly involved in government policy circles play a role in 
creating and presenting the evidence; and 3) the policy changes proposed do not conflict 
with the interests of the relevant policymakers. 
Case Study: Small-holder Dairy Project 
The most obvious recent example of evidence-based policy change lies in the de facto 
(but not de jure) removal of restrictions against small-scale and informal raw milk traders 
and processors. The change followed an active drive by the Small-holder Dairy Project 
(SDP), a collaborative research and development initiative between the International 
Livestock Research Institute (ILRI), Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI) and the 
MoLFD, to raise awareness about the negative effects of these restrictions on the poor 
and the dearth of benefits arising from the restrictions to the general public. Policy 
changes decriminalizing informal milk marketers and easing the licensing process are 
particularly important since these small traders account for the overwhelming proportion 
of marketed milk in Kenya, over 85 percent (Hooten 2004). 
The growth of informal small-scale marketing developed in the wake of liberalization, 
during which time the marketing infrastructure for dairy collapsed. Most notably, the 
government-controlled Kenya Cooperative Creameries (KCC), which had monopsony 
control over the milk industry since 1964, buckled following price deregulation in 1992. 
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After KCC’s demise, small-scale informal milk traders and a handful of large, private 
licensed and regulated processors and packers quickly entered the market. Informal 
traders supplied an estimated 70 percent of Kenya’s milk by 2000.  
Without the KCC, these informal traders have organized themselves into numerous 
marketing cooperatives. In general, however, these organizations remain both fairly weak 
and weakly connected to private processors, who end up reaping most of the profit from 
processed milk. As an alternative, many traders and cooperative groups have opted to 
bring their milk to informal “milk bars”; small shops marketing fresh (raw) unpasteurised 
milk. While it is common practice for nearly all Kenyans to boil milk before drinking it, 
thereby effectively pasteurizing it, government regulations technically forbid the sale of 
raw milk. Yet at the same time, the Kenya Dairy Board (KDB), which is responsible for 
regulating the industry, lacks the real capacity to systematically enforce this regulation. 
Still, with less than one percent of small-scale traders registered, these traders have had 
to work to avoid the authorities, paying bribes instead of taxes.  
To make matters worse, in late 2003, the Kenya Dairy Processors Association, a coalition 
of formal milk processors, joined forces with Tetra-Pak, the largest milk packaging 
manufacturer in Kenya, to launch a massive ‘Safe Milk Campaign’ aimed at convincing 
consumers that only their processed milk was healthy to drink. The campaign argued both 
that informal traders adulterated their milk to increase volumes and, therefore, profits, 
and that drinking raw milk could lead to various diseases, such as brucellosis and 
tuberculosis. The campaign seriously threatened small-holder producers’ and traders’ 
livelihood, as it aimed not only to discourage the general public from buying raw milk, but 
also to force the government to begin systematically enforcing its laws against the 
informal milk trade.  
While the campaign garnered reputability among the masses, the SDP quickly saw it as an 
attempt by these companies to increase their market share by providing inaccurate 
information to the masses. They also recognized that the poor informal producers and 
traders faced serious deterioration in living standards should the campaign succeed. To 
counter the campaign’s claims, SDP held a conference offering substantial evidence 
showing not only that raw milk was unadulterated and sufficiently sanitary, but also that 
significant decreases in informal milk use would harm the health of the poor and destroy 
hundred’s of thousands of livelihoods. This conference set off a “milk war” between the 
SDP and the large processors, who repeatedly questioned the evidence provided by the 
SDP. They and the Kenya Dairy Board (KDB), which initially backed their claims, could not 
provide any scientific counter-evidence, however, and they eventually backed down. 
Ultimately, the end of the “milk war” was the defection of the KDB away from its defense 
of the processors towards collaboration with the SDP.  
The SDP used the “milk war” as a starting point to push for pro-poor policy change. In 
2004, SDP convened a Dairy Policy Forum, attended by the Ministers for Livestock and for 
National Planning, together with parliamentarians. The Forum presented evidence of the 
deleterious effects of restrictions on informal traders, and parliamentarians themselves 
began to push the government to make appropriate policy changes and to listen more to 
scientific evidence in the future. The SDP proposed a new Dairy Bill13 aimed at legalizing 
the informal traders – a bill the Minister of Livestock gave a commitment to passing. The 
proposed bill recognizes the role of small-holder producers and includes methods to 
formalize the informal industry through technology development, training and 
certifications. It also suggests reforms to the KDB to increase its transparency and 
accessibility to all producers. Calls have also been made to streamline and harmonize the 
licensing process, as six licenses issued by three agencies are currently required for milk 
                                                 
13 The researcher was unable to obtain a copy of the proposed bill, despite numerous attempts. 
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traders and handlers.14 While these changes would benefit poor farmers and traders 
considerably, the Dairy Bill has yet to pass – further evidence of the incredibly slow 
political process in Kenya.  
Despite the stalled Dairy Bill, several informal changes have resulted from the SDP effort. 
The KDB has made efforts to beginning licensing – and no longer harassing – small-holder 
producers. In many ways, informal trade has been de facto legalized. The KDB, along with 
NGOs and other partners, has also begun to provide business development assistance to 
help small-scale traders with the licensing process, sanitary handling procedures and 
animal health issues. Some of these programs have been very successful. The Improving 
Quality Assurance in Milk Markets (IQAM) program, which works to incorporate small-scale 
producers into the formal market chain through regulation of milk bars, formalization of 
milk transporters and training on sanitation and marketing, for example, has increased 
participant production levels by 15-50% (Wahome 2007a). The MoLFD also seems to be 
more attentive to the needs of poor producers, with the PS himself pushing for their 
recognition in the new Dairy Bill. Finally, private actors have at least become less openly 
hostile to the small-holder producers. While many still feel that it is “unfair” for them to 
be able to operate unlicensed (and untaxed), some formal producers have encouraged 
collaboration with informal operators.  
The SDP and “milk war” experience points to several important changes and challenges 
that should be noted by those interested in policy and institutional reform in Kenya. On 
the positive side, the small-holder experience shows that Kenyan policy-makers – as well 
as the general public – can be swayed by objective scientific evidence. In this case, it has 
influenced the environment to be more accepting of changes reflecting the reality of 
small-holder production and distribution as dominant. The SDP experience also shows the 
benefits of inter-agency collaboration and cooperation: the SDP project leader was 
actually a MoLFD staff member assigned to SDP, which meant that developments and 
results at SDP were constantly brought into the Ministry’s knowledge and policy process. 
 Nevertheless, several challenges remain. First, as with the draft pastoralist legislation, 
new pro-poor policies created often disappear into the morass of created, but not passed, 
regulations, policies and bills in Kenya. Because these policies threaten large, powerful 
and often politically well-connected actors, it is difficult to get them past the final leg of 
enactment. While unofficial recognition of small-holder production and milk bar use now 
exists and many people say the issue has become moot, a large push is needed to drive 
through actual policy reforms, since small-holders remain vulnerable without it. As an 
IQAM informant states, “The dairy sector is being strangled by colonial legislation that 
should have been repealed a long time ago” (Wahome 2007a). Even if this happens, 
however, a second limitation frequently cited by informants is that even if legislation is 
created, there is often a very large gap between the legislation on paper and its 
implemented reality. For these reasons, several informants insisted the formal policy 
environment doesn’t matter. They point to the fact that it hasn’t been really in synchrony 
with the de facto industry for decades, and while the government has been trying to 
reform it since at least the early 1980s, the industry has continued. This mindset must 
also be changed, however, as without formal rights and recognition, small-scale traders 
will remain vulnerable to pressure for bribes and clientage and thus severely constrained 
in improving their livelihoods. 
                                                 
14 At present, milk traders and handlers must have a producer license, milk bar license and milk movement permit issued by KDB, 
a medical and public health certificate issued by the public health department, and a single business permit issued by local 
authorities (Wahome 2007a). 
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Case Study: Land Reform in Kenya  
The opening of the political space in Kenya and the attempt to draft a new constitution 
have also led to considerable efforts and calls for updating Kenya’s land laws and land 
administration. This reform is crucial to poor livestock producers, particularly those in 
pastoralist areas, as the current land administration system – and its misuse – combined 
with high population growth rates, have been highly detrimental to the viability of the 
pastoralist way of life.15 Because pastoralist communities have historically held very little 
sway in the Kenyan system, and because the power to allocate land has been so highly 
concentrated that those at the top have been able to allocate land as they wish, pastoral 
communities have lost much of their grazing land over time to more politically-significant 
or better connected agriculturalists, private corporations, national parks, individuals and 
state agencies. As a result, many customary grazing routes have been cut off or 
diminished, and in some cases pastoralists have lost their land completely. In such cases, 
these people often resort to urban migration, where they frequently end up raising 
animals or seeking low-skill employment in precarious slum conditions. Or they have little 
alternative but to impinge on agricultural land, increasing animosity between herders and 
sedentary agriculturalists. Clearly, this not only constrains a given community’s ability to 
raise animals, it has also led to heightened conflict among communities, as they fight for 
decreasing grazing resources – violence in pastoralist areas is closely associated with land 
dispossession. Furthermore, many of the individual title-holders do not actually live on 
the land they own, creating difficulties of absentee landlordism. Thus, the possibility of 
real land reform is extremely attractive to these communities. Nonetheless, as badly 
needed as land reform is to Kenya’s livestock producers, and despite the sincere efforts 
being made by some members of Government and civil society, considerable obstacles 
remain in the way of beneficial reforms.  
As mentioned previously, the current land administration system was inherited from the 
colonial system, placing all the allocation power in the hands of the President and 
Commissioner of Lands. This highly centralized system is extremely opaque, and those 
with access to it keep information very close. Few people know exactly how land has been 
allocated, as registration record-keeping is incomplete, and land maps are constantly 
changing for political reasons. Land in Kenya now falls into three categories: 1) land held 
by the government, 2) trust land, held by county councils on behalf of local communities 
in accordance with local customary law, and 3) private land, registered through formal 
legal procedure (Southall 2005). 
At independence and lasting until recently, efforts were made to individualize all land 
ownership under the formal titling system and to move away from use of customary law 
and trust lands. This strategy was largely successful in the redistribution of the “white 
highlands” shortly after independence. Over time, however, there has been a growing 
realization that individualization may be incompatible with pastoralists’ and other 
communities’ way of life. Thus, considerable land has remained communal, and over 50 
percent of the land in Kenya has not been formally allocated (TI 2003). In principle, these 
lands are managed under customary law, though in practice, most are put under the 
custody of local authorities as trust land, meant to be held in the common interest of the 
community. This system has not always worked in favor of the pastoralists, however, as 
local authorities have privileged their own political interests over the true common 
interest (Wanjala, undated).  
                                                 
15 It is important to note that purely political reasons are not the only cause of land conflicts. The population of Kenya has grown 
from only 4 million during colonialism to over 34 million today, and the pressures of this population growth on the land are quite 
apparent. 
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Such abuses of office have been extremely widespread. In a country where agriculture 
comprises the majority of GDP, export income and livelihoods, and where patronage 
politics are the name of the game, land allocation is extremely important for political 
success and guaranteeing loyalty. Interestingly, according to the Minister for Lands, “The 
last 15 years has seen a rise in allocation of land for political purposes. With the 
multiparty era that started in 1990, the land allocation problem reached its peak” (TI 
2003). During the elections of the 1990s, this became a violent political issue as many 
legal title holders, especially in the Rift Valley, were driven from their lands, which were 
then given to KANU loyalists for their votes. Abuse of the land titling system may be the 
rule, rather than the exception. 
Many of the abuses of the post-independence era came out in two important inquiries 
published during the Kibaki administration. The first, the Commission of Inquiry into the 
Land Law System (Njonjo Commission), began in 1999 under Moi and was finished in 2002, 
but was not published until Kibaki came to power. The second, the Presidential 
Commission of Inquiry into Illegal and Irregular Allocation of Public Land (Ndungu 
Commission), was appointed by Kibaki in 2003 to examine unlawful allocations of public 
lands, ascertain the beneficiaries, identify public officials involved and make 
recommendations for land restoration (Southall 2005).  
This latter Commission of 20 prominent citizens, lawyers and civil servants produced the 
bulky and highly damning Ndungu Report.16 It found vast and wide-ranging abuses of not 
only of presidential discretion during both the Kenyatta and Moi administrations, but also 
exploitation of the system in nearly every rank and office of the government system.17 At 
the local level, for example, the allocation of individual plots and the management of 
trust lands have been abused by District Plot Allocation Committees composed of District 
Commissioners, Settlement Officers, Agricultural Officers, MPs, and County Councils 
(ibid). These individuals, rather than respecting their role as protectors of the public 
interest, have benefited greatly – the Ndungu Commission found that councilors grabbed 
more land than anyone else.  
In response to these abuses, the Ndungu Commission, like the Njonjo one before it, called 
for a number of land administration changes, which were largely incorporated into the 
land chapter in the recently rejected Constitution reforms. These included: a 
comprehensive and updated land policy, harmonization of land legislation18, the creation 
of a professional, transparent and parliament-monitored national land commission as well 
as a land division in the high court, a complete inventory and computerization of land 
records, establishment of a Land Titles Tribunal to deal with accusations of irregular land 
allocation, an insurance system for land title deeds, capacity-building at the Ministry of 
Lands, the Attorney General’s Chambers and in the judiciary, and prosecution and 
restitution in cases of illegal land allocation. 
While critiques can be made that the Ndungu report was not damning enough, mainly 
because it did not “name names”, thereby allowing identified perpetrators to walk free, 
the very fact of its publication suggests that positive change in land policy may be 
possible. Since the reports’ publications, a National Land Policy (NLP) reform process has 
                                                 
16 At 244 pages in length with annexes of 976 and 797 pages, the Ndungu report is extremely thorough. 
17 Abuses of office included: granting individual title without consideration for the public interest, for political reasons, and/or 
without following proper legal channels; the allocation of “alienated” public land, despite the fact that it is outside the 
presidential purview to assign; forged letters and documents; the destruction or “misplacement” of records at the Ministry of 
Lands; altered land allocation maps; the illegal granting of public lands, including that reserved for schools and hospitals to third 
parties, individuals and companies for huge sums of money; public corporations being forced to purchase lands to be resold 
illegally to politically connected insiders; and Commissioners of Lands making grants of government land without the knowledge 
or authority of the President. 
18 There are currently more than 40 different complex and overlapping statutes dealing with land administration, ownership and 
use. Few people understand and are aware of all of them. 
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begun. It was launched in February of 2004 at a stakeholders’ workshop, after which a 30-
member, primarily government committee was formed to create a draft policy, which was 
completed in December of 2005, though the draft bill form has yet to be ratified.19 As did 
the Njonjo and Ndungu Commissions, the draft policy calls for a reorganization of the 
Ministry of Lands, upgrading of the lands registry system and the creation of a National 
Land Commission (NLC), which would be lean at the central level, playing a coordinating 
and monitoring role, and have highly autonomous Regional (District) Land Boards and 
Local (Area) Land Committees at more local levels.  
There is considerable worry about the NLP – both in its content, and in its likelihood of 
being enacted and bringing about real change. On the content side, many people worry 
that the current easily-abused powers of the President and Commissioner of Lands will 
simply be transferred to the NLC, and that the devolution suggested will allow for 
continued egregious exploitation at the local level, particularly in communities with weak 
civil society. Concern also remains regarding sufficient safeguards to protect the interests 
of the poor. Much of this comes from their lack of involvement in the creation of the 
policy – the poor were not consulted directly and only 6 of the 30 policy committee 
members were non-governmental individuals, who were meant to represent the interests 
of the poor. The Kenya Land Alliance (KLA), an umbrella NGO aimed at lobbying the 
Kenyan government for appropriate and fair land reform, is particularly concerned with 
this lack of representation for the poor. They feel this crucial omission will “promote the 
continued existence of a policy framework that favors the big private and well-heeled 
developer thus ensuring wealth is generated and retained by only a few people.” (Kenya 
Land Alliance 2004, 3) Furthermore, the lack of input from poor land users means that the 
proposed land policy does not specifically address the needs of pastoralists, and in 
particular the problem of the gradual encroachment of agriculturalists on pastoralists’ 
dry-season grazing land.  
Beyond concerns with the content of the draft NLP, there is also real apprehension that 
the document will never be passed or if passed, implemented. Part of this is based on 
realistic acknowledgement that past efforts at land reform have never brought fruition; 
the Katana Ngala report on coastal lands, the Akiwumi Report on Land Clashes, the Njonjo 
and Ndungu reports, and the current Constitutional recreation have all been frozen at 
some stage. Much of this sluggishness is due to strong resistance by the people who stand 
to lose considerably – those currently involved with land administration and those with 
title deeds gained from illegal land transactions. These individuals, many of whom hold 
vast tracks of land and high government position, are often politically connected enough 
to take the bite out of land reforms. This suggests that while some well-meaning 
individuals in the Kibaki administration do plan for real change, it may be unlikely that 
the government will do little more than posture about land reform – particularly ahead of 
national elections scheduled for the end of 2007. Promising land reform may gain 
currently dissatisfied land users’ and pastoralists’ support, yet it is also in the 
government’s interest not to actually move forward on reform, since land allocation 
remains one of the most profitable sources of patronage in the country. Kibaki will not 
want to upset NARC’s agriculturalist base of support ahead of the elections. Moreover, on 
a purely technical level, it is likely that the government currently lacks the human and 
financial capabilities to establish and implement the proposed changes. For example, 
operationalising the changes would require modifications or repeal of over 30 laws and 
amendments (KLA 2005). 
                                                 
19 The PS of the Ministry of Lands is the Secretary of this committee, which also includes individuals from many other relevant 
ministries including: Local Government, Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries Development, Water Resource Management, 
Environment and Natural Resources, Tourism and Wildlife, Planning and National Development, Regional Development, Roads and 
Public Works, Gender, Sports, Culture and Social Services, the Office of the President and the Attorney General’s Chambers. 
(Kenya Land Alliance 2004). 
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Nevertheless, there are still reasons to remain optimistic, or at least proactive, about the 
land reform process. That the Kibaki administration allowed the damning Njonjo and 
Ndungu Reports to be published and the NLP process to be initiated is promising, as is the 
government pledge to improve land administration in its ERSWEC. Moreover, the fact that 
these documents have all been government-produced suggests that there are people on 
the inside who can be reinforced – the current Minister for Lands is thought to be one of 
these people with a solid understanding of the complexities involved in the land reform 
process.  
Moreover, land reform is highly supported by donors, who have some influence on 
outcomes – the development agencies of the US, Sweden, Ireland, and UN-Habitat have all 
expressed support for the NLP proposals, the World Bank has started a project to digitize 
and improve the land registration system, and the UK Department for International 
Development (DFID) has implemented a major capacity-building program for 7,000 
workers in the land boards and land dispute tribunals. Likewise, CSOs, largely organized 
under the KLA umbrella, have taken an active role in promoting the interests of the poor 
in the reform process, not only lobbying government on their behalf, but also trying to 
make communities more aware of their rights regarding land. While it is unclear how 
successful this will be in Kenya, in Uganda, DFID and the Uganda Land Alliance 
successfully made the government listen to the concerns of the poor in land reform 
debates (Palmer 2000). NGOs have also shown their weight in Tanzania, where many NGOs 
are unwilling to implement new land policies created by government alone (ibid). 
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PART III: CONTINUED OBSTACLES TO PRO-POOR POLICY CHANGE 
While the PPG, SDP and small-holder recognition indicate positive movements in the 
livestock sector of Kenya, serious obstacles still remain in the way of pro-poor policy 
change. As mentioned briefly above, the lack of real policy change or implementation, 
the underdeveloped and non-competitive nature of the meat and live animal industries, 
the insecurity, lack of services and infrastructure in livestock producer areas, particularly 
the ASALs, and the continuing obstacles to pro-poor land reform make helping the 
livestock-dependent poor difficult. 
Difficulty in Moving Forward on Policy Change and Formulation 
When speaking to NGO workers, researchers and even government officials in Kenya, one 
often hears the idea that formal policy doesn’t actually matter, since official policies are 
often severely out of date or even non-existent, making the de facto situation more 
important that the de jure one. Thus we find the Dairy Bill has not been updated since 
the 1950s, despite the fact that it no longer reflects reality in the dairy industry, the 
Livestock Development Policy and Dairy Development Policy have not been modified since 
the early 1980s and 1990s respectively – notwithstanding massive changes to the 
industries’ operations since liberalization, and the ASALs have not had a policy for their 
development since the early 1980s. In this fluid and informal policy environment, the 
wealthy and well-connected are often able to navigate the de facto informal system, yet 
the poor are often excluded, made to feel that anything positive that happens is a favor 
to them, for which they must give something in return, and not a legal right20. Thus 
because they give ultimate rights and recognition, and limit patronage and corruption, de 
jure laws, policies and regulations do matter.  
When there have been attempts to update or create new policies in the past, however, 
few have resulted in real ratified or implemented adjustments. For example, work has 
been on-going for more than a decade to review and revise the Dairy Industry Act and 
Dairy Development Policy with no visible results (Muriuki and Ahuya, undated). Similarly, 
while the National Livestock Policy is now nearing the final review state and presentation 
to the cabinet, and a Veterinary Surgeons Act is awaiting stakeholder validation, efforts 
to update former policy have already taken nearly a decade, and other policies for 
veterinary service delivery and livestock breeding have stalled. While some of these issues 
may be due to budgetary constraints, even when there is ample funding from NGOs and 
donors, when the ERSWEC calls for the changes, and when it appeared that the Kibaki 
government might move quickly, nothing concrete has yet appeared. 
This suggests that efforts are needed to build capacity for policy review, analysis and 
formulation. This will not be an easy task, since technical policy assessments of this sort 
threaten the very nature of the Kenyan political system, where political maneuverings 
and impasses are part of the game. While liberalization has brought many changes, 
democratization has not whisked away the patrimonialism and ethnic favoritism that have 
so stifled the chances for significant policy changes in the past.  
                                                 
20 Thank you to David Leonard for pointing out these impacts of having a largely informal policy environment. 
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Poorly Organized, Non-competitive Meat Industry: Case Study of the 
Revitalized Kenya Meat Commission (KMC) 
A second major obstacle to the development of the livestock sector in Kenya is the under-
developed and largely non-competitive meat and animal marketing system, which makes 
generating profits for poor pastoralists very difficult. Some of the problems with the meat 
industry for poor producers are based around the KMC, the government-controlled 
marketing agency that dominated the sector from the 1940s to the 1970s (by which time 
corruption, mismanagement and policy misdirection had taken their toll) and existed until 
formal liberalization in the late 1980s. While the KMC did buy animals from poor 
producers, payments were often late and incomplete. After liberalization, several local 
abattoirs attempted to take over from the KMC, and managed to drive the KMC out of 
business, but these private organizations did not have the capacity to expand the 
industry. 
Another problem for poor meat producers is that, unlike in the dairy sub-sector, small-
holders have been very weakly integrated into the high yield, high profit production of 
large ranchers – at least partially due to the highly dispersed nature of pastoral 
production and the lack of infrastructure in many pastoralist areas.21 Moreover, ambitious 
government programs aimed at improving livelihoods for poor pastoralists, such as the 
early post-independence Kenya Livestock Development Project usually failed to develop 
desired results, largely because incentives and profits were skewed toward the KMC and 
large ranches, rather than poor producers, who did not supply animals in the quantities 
imagined (IRIN online).  
In the most recent attempt to reverse this situation for poor producers, the KMC was re-
launched amid considerable hype and fanfare in mid-2006. The opening of the KMC is 
being sold as a pro-pastoralist move, aimed at providing a guaranteed market to poor 
livestock producers, particularly during times of drought, creating employment in the 
livestock sector, and providing export market access to the Middle East. Many government 
officials, including the new head of the KMC, seem genuinely optimistic about the 
benefits to poor producers the KMC will bring, and realistic about the failures of the KMC 
in the past. Conversely, other informants suggest that the KMC is not intended so much as 
an economic stimulus, but as a political one in the continued tradition of patronage 
politics. They point to the fact that while the new KMC is being touted as a buyer of last 
resort during droughts, like its predecessor, the old KMC was notorious for extremely late 
payments, for taking all pastoral cattle but then paying for only some, and for paying 
subsidies to well-connected wealthy ranchers and not only to poor pastoralists. Were this 
to happen again, it could actually push poor producers out of the local market.  
Furthermore, many of the problems haunting the initial KMC have not been eliminated – 
there is no good mechanism for bringing NEP and other outlying areas’ animals together 
for export22; transportation and infrastructure are so bad that by the time animals reach 
the KMC facilities in Athi River, located just southeast of Nairobi, they have lost 
considerable weight and value; the quality of pastoralist animals is often too low for the 
high-profit export markets; slaughterhouses where they do exist (few and far between) 
often retain monopsony characteristics, meaning that a very few merchants control all 
sales and prices; and as mentioned earlier, quarantine laws and administration are both 
                                                 
21 As an illustration, Farmer’s Choice has been very successful in developing pork products, which are very popular amongst all 
strata of Kenyan society. Farmer’s Choice, however, has created something of a self-contained system, they have their own 
veterinarians, produce meat without the use of small-holders and even grow their own feed. About 25% of Farmer’s Choice’s 
business is in the beef industry. 
22 As one informant pointed out, “It takes less time to get from Wajir to London than to the Ugandan border!” 
 22
antiquated and ineffective, such that the target export markets may not accept Kenya-
certified animals. Adding to this, pastoralist organizations remain extremely weak, under-
educated and ineffective, so they are not able to push for changes in these conditions.  
Furthermore, the re-introduction of a subsidized livestock industry is quite simply 
unsustainable. The GOK has pledged to privatize the KMC within two years of its opening, 
but many in the media, private and voluntary sectors are questioning this commitment, as 
it is hard to square the profit incentive of privatization with the KMC’s buyer-of-last-
resort welfare function. 
The question remains as to how to deal with these issues of livestock marketing and the 
KMC. As one livestock expert pointed out, the KMC is already back, so the issue now is to 
minimize damage from it, rather than critique its existence. Possible entry points for 
change in this sub-sector will be discussed in Section IV of this report.  
Insecurity in the ASALs 
Probably the biggest obstacle to growth of the meat and live animal sub-sectors is the 
rampant insecurity and lawlessness in the ASALs, which provide some 60 percent of 
animals arriving at the KMC. This issue was brought up in nearly every interview and 
document reviewed pertaining to pastoralism, and simply must be addressed in the long-
term.  
While generalized banditry and lack of sufficient administrative presence are common 
issues in the hinterlands of many new and weak states, drawing to mind Jeff Herbst’s 
(2000) analysis of the inability of African states to “broadcast power” all the way to their 
borders, it is inter-ethnic conflict and cattle rustling that are the primary obstacles to 
pastoralist development in the ASALs. Cattle rustling has been occurring in these areas for 
generations as a traditional sign of manhood and a means to achieve bride price for 
marriage, yet in recent years this traditional practice has become intensified, 
commercialized and increasingly violent with the rising availability of cheap firearms from 
conflicts in neighboring countries. Much of the cattle rustling occurs among ethnicities or 
groups within Kenya, but a good portion is also trans-boundary, occurring on the Sudan, 
Ethiopia, Uganda and Somali borders. For example, the Ugandan Karamojong have been 
armed and raiding Kenyan pastoralists for more than 20 years.  
Many informants stated or insinuated that powerful local actors, government officials like 
chiefs, police officers, and in some cases even MPs are responsible for some of the biggest 
raids. According to Hull (2006), "A Turkana politician or a Pokot politician will incite these 
people and then protect them, and that is how they get their seats." As Immanuel Imana, 
a former MP, told a Kenyan newspaper, the Daily Nation, “The raid was planned with the 
knowledge of the chiefs. How could 300 people assemble without being noticed?” 
(Gettleman 2006). Financial incentives are great for these frontier big men or others 
responsible for the raids – in a region with very little other economic opportunities, 
considerable financial gains are available from selling livestock gained on major markets. 
If it is truly the case that some MPs and local leaders are behind the rustling, making 
changes to the status quo will be very difficult. Moreover, not only does insecurity of this 
nature reduce inter-ethnic trust generally, it also does so between MPs, including those in 
the PPG, who would otherwise fight for increased security together.  
 
For these reasons, searching for commonalities between pastoralist communities and 
pastoralist MPs will be very important, allowing them to see increased incentives for 
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collective action. Strengthening the PPG and pastoralist civil society may help in this 
regard. Since insecurity and cattle rustling are common across many of the countries of 
the Horn of Africa, programs like IGAD’s Conflict Early Warning and Response Network 
(CEWARN) that work to monitor and reduce inter-pastoral conflict, are important. The 
Governments of Kenya and Uganda have also made attempts at conflict reduction and 
dearmification, though the Ugandan government has its hands full with armed conflict in 
its north. The GOK along with its development partners must also intensify efforts to 
develop the region in other ways, making other economic opportunities possible. 
Education is extremely badly needed, as illiteracy rates are upwards of 60 percent among 
the Pokot and 70 percent for the Turkana (Ngugi & Lumwamu 1998)23.  
                                                 
23 The GOK is making efforts nationally to increase education rates through the Universal Primary Education initiative. However, 
ASALs are still considered underserved in this regard. 
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PART IV: CONCLUSION: POSSIBLE & POLITICALLY FEASIBLE ENTRY 
POINTS 
Despite the many obstacles to pro-poor policy or institutional development in Kenya, 
several possible entry points for change currently exist, largely resulting from the opening 
of the political sphere following the movement to multi-party elections. Thus, as civil 
society has blossomed in Kenya, there has emerged a growing understanding that 
pastoralism is a viable lifestyle in the ASALs, a rise in respect for evidence-based decision-
making in policy circles, increasing power of parliament vis-à-vis the executive, and 
perhaps most importantly, a more important electoral role for poor livestock producers, 
especially in the ASALs. These changes have all led to openings for institutional change to 
benefit the livestock dependent poor as the GOK vows to pay increasing attention to the 
livestock sector. 
In this section, we will consider each of the possible policy areas of entry, ranked 
generally based on their political feasibility and likelihood of success. Page numbers in 
parentheses refer to the pages in this report in which these issues were addressed. A 
table summarizing these findings is located at the end of this section. 
The Pastoralist Parliamentary Group (PPG) 
Likelihood of Success: Moderately High 
Possible Entry Points: 
In order to assist the PPG (p. 12-14) to become a more successful lobbying group for the 
interest of pastoralists, several interventions are possible: 
• IGAD LPI should consider working to strengthen the PPG by helping it to formalize by 
developing an organizational structure, office, governing board, officers, etc. Although 
there are benefits to informality, formalization would allow members of the group to 
better coordinate strategies for achieving their goals. It would also provide a concrete 
organization through which they could join forces with others who share their 
objectives, such as CSOs, NGOs, donors and academics.  
• PPG members would benefit greatly from training on such things as parliamentary 
procedure, pastoralist development issues and conflict mediation – which could be 
organized through a formalized PPG secretariat.  
• IGAD LPI should collaborate with other organizations working in pastoralist areas to 
strengthen the civil society capacity of pastoralist communities, so they can lobby 
their MPs and provincial administrators to work towards their interests.  
• making use of IGAD’s unique position in the Horn of Africa, IGAD LPI should consider 
supporting inter-state pastoralist and PPG collaboration on common issues such as 
banditry, cattle rustling, inter-ethnic conflict and disarmament, and opening borders 
to traditional trans-border migratory patterns, by holding regional fora for pastoralists 
MPs.  
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Political Feasibility Assessment:  
The current time period in Kenya is an excellent moment in which to attempt to formalize 
and strengthen the PPG, as pastoralist issues are gaining political salience in the run-up to 
the 2007 national elections, and as MPs gain increasing autonomy from the executive.24  
While in the past, pastoralist alignment with then ruling party KANU was virtually 
guaranteed, allowing government to minimize assistance to pastoralist areas, this is no 
longer the case, and the current NARC-held GOK will not be able to deliberately and 
visibly weaken the PPG as the Moi administration did in the past. In fact, the Kibaki 
Government and allied parties have been making increasing efforts to court pastoralist 
constituencies in the upcoming election. At the same time, however, interventions will 
have to address the political reality of considerable in-fighting among PPG members and 
their constituencies. For this reason, it may be wise to combine support for the PPG with 
continued efforts at reducing insecurity and cattle rusting in these areas, at least partially 
in conjunction with IGAD’s CEWARN efforts. 
Small-holder Dairy Producer Improvements 
Likelihood of Success: Moderately High 
Small-holder dairy producers (p. 14-16) currently produce 86% of the milk in Kenya, but 
most of this milk is traded informally and illegally. Recent events have begun to change 
attitudes towards informal traders, making reforms more possible. 
Possible Entry Points: 
• IGAD LPI should encourage the GOK to move forward on several legal or institutional 
changes in the dairy industry, including: passing and implementing the proposed Dairy 
Bill, de-criminalization of informal milk-producers and/or easing of the formalization 
process, and restructuring the KDB so that it is more representative of actual 
production patterns. 
• IGAD LPI could also work to initiate increased collaboration between large- and small-
scale producers. Strengthening efforts by on-the-ground NGOs to build capacity among 
small-holders and cooperatives in sanitary requirements, handling procedures, and 
organizational skills could help to bring more linkages between the small and large 
producers.  
• IGAD LPI should facilitate increased NGO and research organization collaboration with 
the MoLFD, the KDB and other government institutions. This was immensely helpful at 
the SDP, where the project leader was also a MoLFD staff member, which allowed 
developments at SDP to be brought to the MoLFD and its policy process. 
• to assist in creating policies reflecting industry realities, IGAD LPI could create a 
livestock monitoring system, both within Kenya and regionally. 
Political Feasibility Assessment:  
While large-holder interests still hold most sway at the KDB, the result of the SDP and the 
“milk war” is such that the environment appears currently to be more accepting of 
changes reflecting the reality of production, in which 86% of milk is produced by small-
                                                 
24 It is difficult to predict what will happen following the 2007 elections. Should Kibaki remain in power having gained pastoralist 
votes away from the opposition, it seems possible that they will be rewarded for their change in majority allegiance. However, 
given the current fluidity in both the ruling and opposition parties as of early 2007, too many scenarios seem possible for more 
than speculative analysis. 
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holders. Already, several considerable de facto changes have been made, suggesting that 
also moving forward on formal legal or regulatory change may not meet major opposition. 
Most significantly, informal traders have become essentially (but not actually) legalized 
and are now mostly able to produce and trade milk without fear of retribution. KDB has 
begun efforts to license these small-holder producers and to provide business 
development assistance to make registration easier for them, so helping KDB to simplify 
its registration and licensing process may be welcomed. This change has been supported 
by some of the large-scale producers who can see that there may be financial benefits of 
collaboration. Moreover, key government officials, including the MoLFD Minister and PS, 
as well as MPs, have declared their interest in beginning parliamentary debate on the 
Dairy Bill and legalizing informal trade. Even if licensing fees are reduced, the 
government stands to gain considerable tax revenues if it is able to formalize many of the 
600,000 now-informal traders. 
 
At the same time, we should not be too optimistic that real change will occur quickly. 
The fact that the Dairy Bill has become stalled suggests that there may still be powerful 
dairy interests who feel threatened by the advancement of small-holder producers.  
Making Use of NGOs and Civil Society  
Likelihood of Success: Moderately High 
Possible Entry Points: 
• IGAD LPI should encourage and actively participate in inter-organizational research 
initiatives and programs within Kenya so as to avoid duplication of efforts and make 
use of already-existing resources and on-the-ground knowledge. Relatedly, IGAD LPI 
should support and collaborate with key research organizations, civil society groups 
and NGOs to disseminate and share research findings and program results.  
• IGAD LPI could facilitate the creation of a network of Kenyan actors working on pro-
poor livestock producer issues. Actors to be included in such a network might include: 
ALRMP, CEMRIDE, civil society groups monitoring for CEWARN, DFID, FAO, ILRI, IPAR, 
KARI, KLA, KPF, MoLFD, National Council of Churches of Kenya, Pastoral Development 
Network of Kenya, dairy cooperatives and the PPG. 
Political Feasibility Assessment:  
The Kenyan voluntary sector (p. 9-10) is now stronger than that of any other IGAD 
country, and IGAD LPI should take advantage of the power and versatility of these 
organizations, teaming with them to push forward the pro-poor policy changes suggested 
in this paper. With the opening of political space in Kenya, these groups have become 
able to forcefully vocalize their critiques of government programs and actions that affect 
the livestock dependent poor, and this is likely only to increase in the future. Even when 
the government is wary of civil society actors, it has increasingly taken a participatory 
approach to them, even including some of them in the policy-making process – though this 
may be partially a response to donor “participatory development” requirements.  
 
Furthermore, as another researcher for the IGAD LPI has observed, the success of many 
top-down programs often depends on the inclusion of civil society groups, since NGOs 
tend to have greater experience, ties to local communities and knowledge than do 
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national governments or inter-governmental agencies (Prichard, undated draft). Including 
civil society groups in the development of IGAD LPI work is essential.  
Insecurity  
Likelihood of Success: Low to Moderate 
Possible Entry Points: 
Insecurity among pastoralist groups in the ASALs (p. 24-25) was the most frequently cited 
problem for livestock production in Kenya, and should be seen as a priority by IGAD LPI for 
this reason. Searching for commonalities among pastoralist communities and MPs will be 
very important, allowing them to see increased incentives for collective action. Several 
possibilities for doing this or otherwise reducing insecurity include: 
• IGAD should make use of its unique position to address cross-border issues by 
streghthening the CEWARN initiative and intensifying efforts at disarmament and 
reduction of arms sales along border zones. IGAD might consider expanding CEWARN to 
include a regularized forum in which these cross-border movement and production 
issues could also be considered. 
• strengthening the PPG and increasing inter-ethnic collaboration and discussion in the 
PPG may help to lower conflict and insecurity. 
• it is an issue for the GOK that civil servants, administrators, police and army often do 
not wish to serve in hinterland pastoralist communities. These communities might 
benefit if greater incentives were provided to civil servants such that these posts 
attracted higher qualified, harder-working candidates25 – something that may change 
in the government’s current review of civil servants’ conditions of service. 
Administrators sent to pastoralist areas could also benefit from greater training on 
pastoralism and the pastoral lifestyle. 
• the low level of development in pastoralist ASAL areas is also an issue for insecurity. 
Wherever possible, IGAD LPI should encourage development in these areas, making 
non-cattle-related economic opportunities possible. Education is badly needed, as 
illiteracy rates are upwards of 60 percent among the Pokot and 70 percent for the 
Turkana (Ngugi & Lumwamu 1998). The lack of infrastructure and services is also dire. 
One solution would be to encourage the GOK to pass and implement the Draft National 
Policy for the Sustainable Development of Arid and Semi-Arid Lands, which promises 
additional development assistance to these areas. 
Political Feasibility Assessment:  
Some of these possible interventions are less feasible than others, since it reportedly is 
often well-placed politicians, police and civil servants who benefit from insecurity.  
Therefore, efforts to better educate these very individuals on pastoralist issues may be 
futile. Furthermore, while it is perhaps unlikely that the GOK would introduce additional 
financial, material or other incentives for administrators in these areas, as it is said that 
the government has historically used these assignments to “punish” wayward or incapable 
employees, a review of service conditions for civil servants is currently underway by the 
GOK, so these changes may be possible. Particularly as these hinterland areas become “up 
for grabs” in the coming elections, it is possible that the government will increase 
                                                 
25 This is not to suggest that all civil servants and administrators in pastoralist areas are not hard-working, only that inducing 
candidate of the highest quality to these posts has historically been a serious challenge for the GOK. 
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development initiatives in them through service provision and infrastructure. Given the 
extremely slow pace of the draft ASAL policy, however, it is unlikely that this particular 
effort will be quickly implemented. 
On the positive side, centralized inter-governmental efforts to reduce cross-border 
conflict seem to be paying off somewhat – the Kenyan Government at the national level 
appears willing to work on these issues. Although IGAD’s CEWARN program is relatively 
new, it has received strong recommendations and should be strengthened where possible. 
Other international and non-governmental organizations pursuing similar ends could be 
brought into these strategies as well – for example, World Vision began a $3.3m program 
called POTAKUSA to end rustling between Kenya and Uganda in 2003. The Governments of 
Kenya and Uganda have also made attempts to reduce conflict and disarm, though the 
Ugandan government must also deal with armed conflict in its northern regions.  
Animal Health 
Likelihood of Success: Moderate 
Possible Entry Points: 
• taking advantage of IGAD’s unique regional position, IGAD LPI could assist member 
countries to harmonize their disease control methods and develop border screening 
points. 
• to increase the reliability of service provided by CAHWs, the Kenyan Government and 
the KVB might find it useful to formally recognize and accredit CAHWs training 
according to nationally accepted standards. IGAD LPI could assist the GOK to build 
capacity by developing these standards. 
• the GOK may also wish to introduce tax breaks or other incentives for trained 
veterinarians to work in remote pastoralist areas. 
Political Feasibility Assessment:  
In general, CAHWs are accepted and their use is fairly well institutionalized in Kenya, 
making them something of a political “non-issue” for most informants. Working to 
strengthen and standardize the quality of the services they provide could only be useful, 
although may not be the highest priority area for IGAD LPI. More useful for pastoralist 
communities in particular might be to encourage fully trained veterinarians to work in 
their areas, although the likelihood of the government successfully providing tax breaks or 
other incentives for veterinarians to move to remote areas is low.  
Land Use 
Likelihood of Success: Low to Moderate 
Possible Entry Points: 
Access to land (p. 17-21) is crucial for poor livestock producers, particularly pastoralists, 
who have seen their access to grazing land shrink considerably in the last century. 
Reforms pertaining to land may include: 
• IGAD LPI could support movement forward on the National Land Policy reforms by 
facilitating a consolidated response from stakeholders to the draft policy. 
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• IGAD LPI could work with member governments to open borders to traditional trans-
border migratory patterns, so as to reduce negative impacts of drought. The East 
African Community states, of which Kenyan and Uganda are also IGAD members, are in 
discussions on free movement of people between the states. 
• IGAD LPI should provide support to organizations like the KLA, the PPG, and the 
Pastoral Development Network of Kenya that work to promote the interests of the poor 
in the NLP process. In particular, IGAD LPI should ensure that they make well-reasoned 
presentations on the needs of pastoralists to the NLP reformers. 
• IGAD LPI might work to develop dry land folder harvesting, storage and management 
technology, so that pastoralists can make better use of the land to which they have 
access. 
Political Feasibility Assessment:  
Movement forward on land reform so as to benefit the livestock dependent poor will be at 
best, an uphill battle, although there are some indications that space has opened for 
change. Most importantly, key individuals within government – including the Minister of 
Lands – appear to be supportive of reforms and to be creative in their approach. Thus, for 
example, efforts to break the operational chain of corruption at the local level have been 
made at the Ministry of Lands, where officers stationed at the same office for more than 
three years have been shuffled. The ministry has also started a complaints center at the 
Nairobi headquarters to at least attempt to increase accountability in the land allocation 
system. The government has also published several damning reports on land 
administration abuses, worked to develop a draft National Land Policy over the past two 
years and has promised that such a policy will be enacted. 
However, while these developments all indicate a move in the right direction, it is the 
assessment of this report that the obstacles to change may still outweigh the possibilities. 
First, land allocation has historically been one of the most politically important tools of 
the executive office and local administrators, and it is extremely unlikely that land 
granting power will be given up without a protracted battle. Second, although pastoralist 
issues are increasingly gaining political salience, agriculturalists, many of whose interests 
in land conflict with those of pastoralists, are currently more politically important to the 
Kibaki/NARC government as it seeks re-election. Third, even if land reforms were to go 
through, it is unlikely that they will reflect the interests of poor livestock producers, as 
these individuals have been largely neglected in the land reform consultations and 
processes.  
Nevertheless, it is recommended that IGAD LPI remain cautiously optimistic and proactive 
since this may be the best opening available: IGAD LPI should not miss a possible 
opportunity because of skepticism that real reform simply cannot happen. If nothing else, 
IGAD LPI should work to highlight the key issues pertaining to poor livestock producers at 
a time when the public, civil society and parliament are discussing them. Doing so may 
not achieve the ideal land rights situation for the poor, but it could prevent their further 
marginalization. IGAD LPI should therefore collaborate with and support pro-poor 
organizations like the KLA, the National Council of Churches of Kenya and the Pastoral 
Development Network of Kenya that are working to make the interests of the poor heard 
in the land reform process. 
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Animal Marketing & Exports 
Likelihood of Success: Fairly Low  
Possible Entry Points: 
In order for pastoralists and other animal producers to improve their livelihood, animal 
marketing systems will need to be improved: 
• IGAD LPI could assist the GOK to create a plan for the privatization of the KMC. 
• the GOK might consider increasing the number and availability of slaughterhouses and 
transit points for meat and live animal transportation. 
• IGAD LPI could support the Kenyan Government in updating and increasing regulation 
of animal health for exports, including quarantine facilities. Similarly, it could 
facilitate coordiation of disease control measures and quarantine conditions between 
member governments of IGAD. 
• IGAD LPI could assist in government capacity-building by providing training for DVS 
officials on current global standards for quarantines and animal health. 
Political Feasibility Assessment:  
Unfortunately, the majority of possible entry points in the animal marketing and export 
promotion policy area rank low on an assessment of political feasibility and ability to help 
poor livestock producers. For example, while it may be possible to formally update and 
strengthen legislation, regulations and technical capacity for animal health and 
quarantine facilities, it is highly questionable that these institutions will be respected. In 
the 1970s, disease-free zones existed, allowing exports to lucrative European markets, 
but access ended after only several years, when it became clear that politically powerful 
cattle ranchers, as well as local pastoralists, were ignoring them. Since the same actors 
often remain, there is little reason to expect a change in action for the five disease-free 
zones that currently exist. This being said, the risk of infection and animal and profit loss 
from the on-going outbreak of RVF, which by the end of January 2007 had resulted in 118 
human deaths, might sway ranchers in a new direction (Wahome 2007), as might the re-
opening of the market in Saudi Arabia. It is only this latter development that will have a 
significant impact on poor livestock producers, who may be able to sell their small 
ruminants to Saudi buyers.  
Finally, it appears fairly unlikely that the KMC will be effectively privatized within two 
years of its re-opening, as promised by the GOK. First, although many have high hopes for 
KMC’s success, the projected profitability of corned beef exports seems unrealistic. 
Second, for the KMC to be a profitable enterprise, it would probably need to give up its 
welfare mandate as a buyer-of-last-resort for pastoralists during drought times. This is 
unlikely to happen, as it is largely for this politically significant welfare function that the 
KMC was reopened in 2006. Therefore, interventions at the level of the KMC are unlikely 
to succeed. 
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Summary of possible entry points for the IGAD LPI and their likelihood 
of success 
Policy Area Possible Policy Changes Likelihood 
of Success 
Pastoralist & 
PPG 
Development 
Legal or Institutional Reform 
 Pass and implement the Draft National National Policy for the 
Sustainable Development of Arid and Semi-Arid Lands 
 Provide formal incentive for civil servants sent to the ASALs 
  
Capacity Building 
 Provide support to the Pastoralist Parliamentary Group  
o Institutionalization of PPG through Formalization 
o Training for members on parliamentary procedure, 
development issues and conflict mediation  
 Assist local pastoralist community organizations: allow them to 
better voice interests to PPG members and provincial 
administrators. 
 Provide support to administrators and civil servants in 
pastoralist areas 
o Training on pastoralism as a viable economic and 
social system 
 
 
LOW 
 
LOW 
 
 
MODERATE-
HIGH 
 
 
 
MODERATE 
 
LOW 
 
Small-holder 
Dairy 
Legal or Institutional Reform 
 Pass the proposed Dairy Bill 
 Pass de jure decriminalization of informal milk producers 
 Ease process of formalization for small-holder producers 
 
Capacity Building 
 Provide support for small-holders and their cooperatives: 
increase their ability to protect their self-interest and increase 
collaboration with large-scale producers 
o Training on sanitary requirements and handling 
procedures 
 
 
MODERATE 
MODERATE 
MODERATE 
 
 
MODERATE 
 
Insecurity Legal or Institutional Reform 
 Increase incentives for civil servants working in pastoralist 
areas 
 
Inter-organizational Collaboration 
 Address cross-border issues through IGAD’s unique position and 
forum for discussion 
o Strengthen CEWARN initiative 
o  Intensify disarmament campaigns 
 
 
LOW 
LOW 
 
 
HIGH 
Civil Society 
and NGOs 
Inter-organizational Collaboration 
Encourage and actively participate in inter-organizational research 
initiatives, programs, dissemination of research findings, etc. 
Provide support to key non-governmental actors such as ILRI, KLA, 
CEMRIDE, etc. to take advantage of their on-the-ground knowledge 
 
HIGH  
 
HIGH 
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Veterinary 
Care 
Legal or Institutional Reform 
 Formally accredit and recognize CAHWs trained according to 
the KVB’s guidelines 
 Provide incentives for veterinary health workers to go to 
primarily pastoralist areas 
 
 
MODERATE 
 
LOW 
Animal 
Marketing & 
Exports 
Legal or Institutional Reform 
 Create a plan for the privatization of the KMC 
 Update and increase regulation of animal health for exports, 
including quarantine facilities 
 
Capacity Building 
 Provide training for DVS officials on current global standards 
for quarantines 
 
Inter-organizational Collaboration 
 Facilitate coordiation of disease control measures and 
quarantine conditions between member governments of IGAD. 
 
 
LOW 
MODERATE 
 
 
 
MODERATE 
 
 
 
LOW-
MODERATE 
Land Use Legal or Institutional Reform 
 Facilitate movement forward on the National Land Policy 
reforms 
 Open borders to traditional trans-border migratory patterns 
 
Capacity Building 
 Support to organizations like the KLA which work to promote 
the interests of the poor in the land reform process 
 
 
LOW 
LOW-
MODERATE 
 
 
HIGH 
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